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1. Introduction 
In his book Intuitionism,
1
 David Kaspar is after the truth. That is to 
say, on his view, “philosophy is the search for the whole truth” (p. 7). 
Intuitionism, then, “reflects that standpoint” (p. 7). My comments are meant to 
reflect the same standpoint. More explicitly, my aim in these comments is to 
evaluate the arguments for intuitionism, as I understand them from reading 
Kaspar’s book. In what follows, I focus on three arguments in particular, 
which can be found in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Intuitionism: an inference to the 
best explanation, an argument from the analogy between mathematical 
knowledge and moral knowledge, and an argument from the epistemic 
preferability of the intuitive principles. I will discuss them in this order. 
 
2. Intuitionism and Inference to the Best Explanation 
What is intuitionism? According to Kaspar, “Intuitionism is the 
moral theory which claims that you know what’s right” (p. 2). More precisely, 
as I understand it, intuitionism consists of the following theses: 
 
(I1) We have moral knowledge in the form of fundamental 
moral principles, or “intuitive principles,” such as “Keeping 
promises is required” and “Harming others is wrong” (p. 
16). 
 
(I2) The intuitive principles are self-evident, a priori truths (p. 
36). 
 
(I3) The intuitive principles cannot be proved (p. 54); we know 
that they are true by intellectual intuition, that is, they 
intellectually appear true to us (p. 63). 
 
(I4) The intuitive principles are necessary truths (p. 63). 
 
                                                          
1 David Kaspar, Intuitionism (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012). All references to the 
book in the symposium are by page numbers in parentheses.  
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Given this characterization of intuitionism, in what follows I will be 
concerned with the following question: What are the arguments in support of 
(I1)-(I4)? (Henceforth, by “intuitionism” I mean theses [I1] through [I4].) 
I think that the overall argument for intuitionism in Kaspar’s 
Intuitionism is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). As 
Kaspar writes: 
 
[I]ntuitionism claims that the best way to explain both the 
convincingness and the persistence of certain moral beliefs, such as 
the promise principle, is to assert that they are self-evidently true. (p. 
41, emphasis added) 
 
That is to say, Kaspar lists what he takes to be common beliefs about morality 
(p. 3): 
 
(a) You know what’s right. (For instance, you know that “Depriving 
others of liberty is wrong,” that “Keeping promises is required,” 
and that “Harming others is wrong” [p. 16].) 
 
(b) Not everything is black and white. 
 
(c) Sometimes, in extreme cases, it is morally permissible to lie, 
steal, and so on. 
 
(d) We each feel more confident claiming that we have a duty to 
keep our promises, for example, than claiming that other people 
do. 
 
(e) There are emergencies in which a cold cost-benefit assessment 
makes the most moral sense. 
 
(f) There is no way to prove that, for instance, harming others is 
wrong. 
 
(g) Ethics is not a hard science. 
 
(h) Supreme principle moral theories, such as utilitarianism or 
Kantianism, are not initially convincing, and are often not 
ultimately convincing. 
 
(i) There is no satisfactory way to resolve some moral 
disagreements at certain times. 
 
(j) Most of our duties are based on particular relations we have to 
other people. 
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(k) Moral absolutism was more plausible before the twentieth 
century, and less plausible during and after the twentieth 
century. 
 
(l) Moral disagreement is common. 
 
He then argues that intuitionism explains why we have these common beliefs 
about morality better than its competitors do (p. 23). As he writes: 
 
Both the persistence of moral beliefs across eras and the persistence 
of the primary data of ethics are best explained by the intuitive 
principles being self-evidently true. (p. 24, emphasis added) 
 
For example, as far as (a) is concerned, in particular, knowing that “Harming 
others is wrong,” Kaspar says the following: 
 
“Harming others is wrong” is a fundamental moral truth. We know 
this, and we are secure in our knowledge of this. We are not apt to 
disagree about moral propositions of this sort. The reason why, 
according to intuitionism, is that such propositions are self-evidently 
true. And the reason we know them is that our minds can adequately 
understand these propositions, and know them on that basis. (p. 17) 
 
More generally, for any belief that p (where p is a fundamental moral 
statement, such as “Harming others is wrong” or “Keeping promises is 
required”), we believe that p because p is self-evidently true. 
I think that there is a potential problem with this argumentative 
strategy, namely, arguing for intuitionism by IBE. In order to see the problem, 
take the first item on Kaspar’s list, which intuitionism is supposed to explain 
better than its competitors, namely, “(a) You know what’s right” (p. 3), for 
example, you know that keeping promises is required. The IBE would then go 
as follows: 
 
(1) You believe that you know that keeping promises is required. 
 
(2) The best explanation for (1) is that “keeping promises is 
required” is self-evidently true (i.e., [I2]). 
 
Therefore, probably, 
 
(3) (I2) is true. 
 
The key premise in this IBE, of course, is the second premise. To evaluate this 
IBE, then, we need to ask: Is the (self-evident) truth of a belief really the best 
explanation for the fact that you hold that belief? After all, we often believe 
falsehoods, and we often believe truths, but for the wrong reasons. Moreover, 
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sometimes the best explanation for why one holds a particular belief is 
psychological, in terms of the genesis of the belief, not epistemic or semantic 
(i.e., in terms of justification or truth). For example, the best explanation for 
why Sheena believes that God exists may be that she was raised in a religious 
household rather than that she carefully considered the arguments for and 
against theism. Likewise, the best explanation for why we have modal 
intuitions may be that essentialism is a reasoning heuristic or mental shortcut, 
not that objects have real essences.
2
 
In other words, our beliefs are not always sensitive to the truth. If this 
is correct, then (I2) would best explain (a) only if our beliefs about morality 
track moral truth. To assume that our beliefs about morality track moral truth, 
however, is to assume that our beliefs about morality amount to knowledge, at 
least on some conceptions of knowledge,
3
 which is precisely the question at 
hand. In other words, intuitionism is the view that we have moral knowledge. 
However, the aforementioned IBE for intuitionism works only if it is assumed 
that our beliefs about morality track the truth about morality, that is, that they 
amount to knowledge. 
I think that a similar problem arises with respect to other items on 
Kaspar’s list. Take, for example, “(f) There is no way to prove that, for 
instance, harming others is wrong” (p. 3). The IBE for intuitionism, then, 
would go as follows: 
 
(1) We believe that there is no way to prove that harming others is 
wrong. 
 
(2) The best explanation for (1) is that “‘Harming others is wrong’ 
cannot be proved” is self-evidently true (i.e., [I2]). 
 
Therefore, probably, 
 
(3) (I2) is true. 
 
As in the case of the first IBE, the key premise of this IBE is the second 
premise. In order to evaluate this IBE, then, we need to ask again: Is the (self-
evident) truth of a belief really the best explanation for the fact that you hold 
that belief? As mentioned above, our beliefs are not always sensitive to the 
truth. If this is correct, then “‘Harming others is wrong’ cannot be proved” 
would best explain the fact that we believe it only if our belief tracks the truth. 
But again, to assume that our beliefs about morality track the truth about 
morality is to assume that our beliefs about morality amount to knowledge, at 
                                                          
2 See Moti Mizrahi, “Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological,” Croatian Journal 
of Philosophy 14, no. 40 (2014), pp. 65-72. 
 
3 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), p. 179. 
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least on some conceptions of knowledge,
4
 which is precisely the question at 
hand. In other words, intuitionism is the view that we have moral knowledge. 
However, the aforementioned IBE for intuitionism works only if it is assumed 
that our beliefs about morality track the truth about morality, that is, that they 
amount to knowledge. 
This potential problem with the IBE for intuitionism does not amount 
to a decisive objection, but I think that it urges intuitionists to get clear on 
concepts like knowledge and about what counts as the best explanation for our 
moral beliefs. To be clear, I am not trying to saddle intuitionists with the 
difficult task of analyzing knowledge. However, insofar as the theory itself is 
stated in terms of knowledge—in particular, theses (I1) and (I3)—I think that 
it is important to get clear on the concept in question in order to make the IBE 
for intuitionism work. 
 
3. An Argument from the Analogy of Moral and Mathematical 
Knowledge 
Kaspar points out that intuitionists like H. A. Prichard and W. D. 
Ross compare moral knowledge to mathematical knowledge (pp. 25, 33, 35, 
44-48, 66-67, and 71-72). For example: 
 
When we learn the basic concepts and notations of arithmetic, we can 
apprehend the truth of 2 + 2 = 4. Intuitionism claims that everyone 
can apprehend the truth of “Harming others is wrong” in a similar 
way. (p. 43) 
 
 Recall that, according to intuitionism, what we know are the intuitive 
principles. In that case, an analogical argument for moral knowledge can be 
made as follows: 
 
(1) Mathematical propositions (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4) are self-evident and 
are known to be necessarily true a priori. 
 
(2) The intuitive principles (e.g., “Harming others is wrong”) are 
self-evident. 
 
Therefore, probably, 
 
(3) The intuitive principles are known to be necessarily true a priori 
(i.e., [I4]). 
 
The similarity between mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge, then, 
is that both are of self-evident propositions. Let us grant this similarity 
between mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge for the sake of 
argument. As far as analogical arguments are concerned, they can be stronger 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
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or weaker depending on the strength of the analogy. If there are more 
similarities than dissimilarities between the things compared, the analogy is 
strong. Conversely, if there are more dissimilarities than similarities between 
the things compared, the analogy is weak. In this case, we have a point of 
similarity between mathematical and moral knowledge: the propositions 
known are self-evident. Are there any points of dissimilarity between 
mathematical and moral knowledge? I think there might be. Consider the 
following: 
 
(D1) Unlike mathematical propositions, moral propositions are 
subject to widespread disagreement. 
 
(D2) Unlike mathematical propositions, there are no proofs as far 
as moral propositions are concerned. 
 
(D3) Unlike moral propositions, intuitions about mathematical 
propositions cannot be “reset” by experience. 
 
Let us consider each of these in turn. Kaspar considers (D1), but argues that 
“there is mathematical disagreement” just as there is moral disagreement (p. 
45). He gives the following example: 
 
 ¼ + ½ =  
 
And then writes: 
 
You might say the answer is obvious: ¾. If anything is self-evident, 
if there is any proposition on which we can all agree ¼ + ½ = ¾ 
would be it. But others disagree. Even if you give them time to think 
it through, they will claim that the answer is ⅓. Ask any math 
teacher. Ask any university math teacher. There is a reason this is 
called a “common mistake” of adding fractions. So if mere 
disagreement is sufficient to demonstrate our ignorance concerning a 
certain subject matter, then we are ignorant that ¼ + ½ = ¾. Since we 
know this equation with certainty, and since our certainty about 
elementary mathematical propositions cannot exclude disagreement 
about them, that means that “If we have intuitive knowledge of self-
evidence mathematical propositions, there ought to be no 
mathematical disagreement” is false. (p. 46) 
 
I think that this is an example of error, not disagreement. First, it can be 
shown why ⅓ is not the correct answer. Second, it can be demonstrated that ¾ 
is the correct answer. Finally, the error, or “common mistake,” can be 
diagnosed as a failure to make sure that the fractions have a common 
denominator before adding them up. Arguably, no such demonstrations and 
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diagnoses can be had as far as moral propositions are concerned, which leads 
me to (D2). 
As mentioned above, intuitionists are committed to (I3), that is, the 
claim that the intuitive principles cannot be proved (p. 54). However, there are 
proofs in mathematics. On the face of it, then, it looks like moral knowledge 
and mathematical knowledge are not analogous in that respect. Intuitionists 
might try to account for this apparent dissimilarity by saying that the intuitive 
principles are analogous to axioms in mathematics. An axiom is a 
mathematical proposition that is taken to be self-evidently true but that cannot 
be proven. For example, one of the axioms of arithmetic is that addition is 
commutative. Hardly any mathematician doubts that addition is commutative 
even though it cannot be proven for all integers. Perhaps the intuitive 
principles are the axioms of ethics. The problem with this, however, is that 
there are legitimate doubts about the intuitive principles. Take, for example, 
“Harming others is wrong.” What about harming others in self-defense? Is 
that wrong? What about harming others in war? Is that wrong? What about 
harming others to save the lives of many (e.g., torturing a suspect believed to 
have information about a dirty bomb that is about to explode in a densely 
populated area)? Is that wrong? Arguably, no such doubts arise as far as the 
axioms of arithmetic are concerned. This, then, brings us back to the issue of 
disagreement in (D1). 
Regarding (D3), suppose that every time you take two apples and 
two more apples you end up with five apples. Suppose further that you do this 
several times. Would the fact that you have somehow ended up with five 
apples rather than four, as you might have expected, make you revise your 
intuitions about 2 + 2 = 4? Arguably not; rather than think that 2 + 2 = 4 is 
now false, and 2 + 2 = 5 is now true, you would probably think that something 
goes wrong whenever you count the apples. In fact, any explanation for why 
you end up with five apples (e.g., someone is playing a trick on you) would be 
more likely than that 2 + 2 now equals 5. But intuitionists want to claim that 
this sort of thing happens with moral intuitions. As Kaspar writes: 
 
Witnessing two world wars, governments exterminating millions of 
their own people, justified instances of intentional civilian bombing, 
have reset our intuitions, making them in several ways more 
accurate. (p. 24, emphasis added) 
 
Take Jones, a young woman raised as a moral nihilist by her parents. 
She believes that there is nothing wrong with harming others, and her 
intuitions accord with that belief. But then Jones witnesses someone 
being severely beaten. She thinks about it, continues to believe there 
is nothing wrong with what happened, but then she considers “It is 
wrong to harm others” [and] it seems to her to be true. (p. 64) 
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On the face of it, then, it looks like moral intuitions and mathematical 
intuitions are not analogous in that respect. The former can be “reset” by 
experience, whereas the latter cannot be “reset” by experience.  
If this is correct, then given these dissimilarities between 
mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge, namely, (D1)-(D3), I think 
that the analogy between the two needs to be reevaluated. 
 
4. An Argument from the Epistemic Preferability of the Intuitive 
Principles 
According to Kaspar, “Intuitionism holds that we recognize that 
lying is wrong, and that is our best reason not to lie” (p. 18). This is supposed 
to hold for any intuitive principle. As Kaspar writes, “any intuitive principle 
will be found to be epistemically preferable to the principle of utility” (or any 
other “supreme principle of morality,” such as Kantianism or 
Contractarianism) (p. 60). For example, as a reason not to lie, “Lying is 
wrong” is “epistemically preferable” to “Lying will not maximize good.” The 
way we find this out, according to Kaspar, is by direct epistemic appraisal. 
That is to say, when we compare an intuitive principle, such as “Lying is 
wrong” with what a supreme principle of morality dictates in an actual moral 
situation, such as “Lying will not maximize good,” we find that the former is 
epistemically preferable to the latter (p. 60). 
As an argument for intuitionism, then, the argument from the 
epistemic preferability of the intuitive principles can be stated as follows: 
 
(1) If p is epistemically preferable to q, then we know that p. 
 
(2) The intuitive principles (e.g., “Lying is wrong,” “Keeping 
promises is required,” “Harming others is wrong”) are epistemically 
preferable to supreme principles of morality (e.g., Utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, Contractarianism). 
 
Therefore, 
 
(3) We have moral knowledge in the form of intuitive principles 
(e.g., “Lying is wrong,” “Keeping promises is required,” “Harming 
others is wrong”) (i.e., [I1]). 
 
The key to evaluating this argument, I think, is getting clear on what 
“epistemically preferable” means. 
One reading of “epistemically preferable” is the following: p is 
epistemically preferable to q when p provides a stronger reason to do (or not 
do) A than q does. Suppose that I am considering harming a person. One 
reason not to do it is that harming others is wrong. Another reason is that 
acting in ways that bring about more bad consequences (pain) than good 
consequences (pleasure) is wrong. If intuitionism is true, then the former 
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provides a stronger reason to refrain from harming a person than the latter 
does. But is that really the case? Consider the following: 
 
 (P1) Harming others is wrong. 
 
 Therefore, 
 
(C1) If I harm this person, I would be doing something wrong. (from 
P1) 
 
 Therefore, 
 
 (C2) I should not harm this person. (from C1) 
 
Contrast the above argument with this one: 
 
(P2) Producing less than maximal pleasure (versus pain) is wrong. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(C3) If I inflict pain on this person, I would be doing something 
wrong. (from P2) 
 
 Therefore, 
 
 (C4) I should not inflict pain on this person. (from C3) 
 
These two arguments look very similar in structure. In both arguments, the 
intermediate conclusion necessarily follows from the first premise. That is, C1 
follows necessarily from P1, and C3 follows necessarily from P2. Likewise, in 
both arguments, the final conclusion necessarily follows from the intermediate 
conclusion by assuming that one should not do what is morally wrong. That 
is, C2 follows necessarily from C1, and C4 follows necessarily from C3. If 
this is correct, then it is not clear to me that P1 provides a stronger reason to 
refrain from harming a person than P2 does. 
Since Kaspar stresses that “epistemic appraisal does not provide 
conclusive evidence for a proposition” (p. 61, emphasis added), perhaps this is 
not an adequate reading of “epistemically preferable.” Another reading of 
“epistemically preferable,” then, is the following: p is epistemically preferable 
to q when p occurs to us first in thought before q does. In other words, p is 
epistemically preferable to q just in case p is prior to q in the order of thought 
but not necessarily in the order of justification. This reading is suggested by 
the distinction between epistemic confidence (or certainty) and psychological 
confidence (or certainty) (p. 61). If this is correct, then “Harming others is 
wrong” is epistemically preferable to “Maximizing pain is wrong” because it 
is the first reason that comes to mind when we think about harming someone. 
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The problem with this reading of “epistemically preferable,” 
however, is that the fact that one reason occurs to us prior to another may be 
due to factors that have nothing to do with the quality of that reason (i.e., with 
whether it is a good reason or not). “Biases, wishful thinking, hidden 
antipathies and affections” (p. 15), as well as other factors, may explain why 
one reason comes to mind prior to another. The good news, I think, is that 
empirical research can help us figure out when some reasons occur to us first 
because of biases. For example, Robert Nozick’s intuitive reaction to his own 
“experience machine” thought experiment is that he would not want to be 
plugged into the machine.
5
 Many philosophers, as well as non-philosophers, 
share this intuitive reaction. A recent study, however, suggests that people 
have this intuitive reaction to Nozick’s thought experiment not because they 
value reality over virtual experience, but because “people are averse to 
abandon the life they have been experiencing so far, regardless of whether 
such life is virtual or real.”6 Social scientists call this the “status quo bias.” 
Felipe De Brigard shows that the status quo bias explains why people 
intuitively react to the “experience machine” thought experiment the way they 
do by presenting subjects with a “reverse experience machine,” in which they 
are told that they are already plugged into the machine and now have the 
opportunity to be unplugged and go back to their real lives. In response to the 
“reverse experience machine” thought experiment, most subjects say that they 
would like to remain in the machine.
7
 This study suggests that what occurs to 
most people first upon considering the “experience machine” thought 
experiment is not some deep moral truth but a reflection of the status quo bias. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There is a lot more in Kaspar’s Intuitionism than I can discuss in this 
brief comment. Here I have considered only three arguments, which can be 
found in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Intuitionism: an inference to the best 
explanation, an argument from the analogy between mathematical knowledge 
and moral knowledge, and an argument from the epistemic preferability of the 
intuitive principles. I have pointed out what I take to be some potential 
problems with these arguments. I do not think that any of these problems 
amounts to a decisive objection against intuitionism. Rather, these comments 
are meant to be taken as an invitation to refine these arguments, not abandon 
them.
8
 
                                                          
5 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 44.  
 
6 Felipe De Brigard, “If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?” Philosophical 
Psychology 23, no. 1 (2010), pp. 43-57. 
 
7 Ibid., p. 49.  
 
8 I am grateful to Irfan Khawaja for inviting me to participate in this symposium and to 
David Kaspar for discussions about his book. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
